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Following the result of the first round of the French Presidential elections, it seems that –
at last – a new wind is blowing in the European sky. The much sidestepped “growth agenda” is
slowly gaining currency in the European political discourse and calls for pro-growth measures, for a European
growth strategy and for a reconsideration of the strict adherence to fiscal rules are no longer received as heterodox,
as dangerous or marginal. Talking about ‘the growth question’ is becoming legitimate again, it is becoming
mainstream! The orthodoxy of fiscal discipline of course remains. But talking about growth is no longer a taboo
(before becoming too jubilant, however, see also this piece of deja vu). From all corners of Europe, from the Dutch
labour party to the Governing Council of the ECB, and from the offices of the Commission to the streets of Spain,
more and more voices – not only by the disillusioned public but increasingly from key political figures and policy
officials – are heard calling for the need to establish pro-growth instruments to counter-balance fiscally-induced
austerity. All this is nice of course – and much needed. And the Greeks may be excused to feel that they are
vindicated, as they were among the first to question (and to suffer from) the austerity recipe. They may be excused
to feel that something is changing also for Greece, that new allies are coming out to support Greece’s case for
growth, that the spirit of Keynesianism is coming back – and, with it, salvation for the ailing Greek economy is on its
way. But there is a problem – or two.
There is no question that, across Europe, just like in Greece, the excessive emphasis on fiscal consolidation through
supply-side measures, tax rises and public expenditure cuts has led to economic suffocation. This is indeed the
problem that the “new growth agenda” is trying to address. But when the likes of Hollande, Barroso, Barnier and
Draghi talk about growth, what they have in mind is not a blank cheque for fiscal profligacy and state-led expansion
that would keep afloat otherwise unsustainable political economies. What they are talking about is simply a re-
tuning: the rebalancing of positive and negative actions, the recalibration of the policy recipe to allow a more activist
approach to dealing with Europe’s debt problems. An approach that takes care of the ‘denominator’. No doubt, this
is important for Greece too: the country has been sliding deeper and deeper into recession as the state takes more
and more money out of the economy and into the coffers of its creditors – in what is essentially a badly implemented
version of a poorly conceived therapy. So, surely, the Hollande agenda of infusing more Keynesianism into Europe’s
own Washington Consensus and finding the resources to finance (public) investments and to increase job-creation
is important for Greece as it is for the rest of Europe. But for Greece there is more, much more, to it than that.
In most parts of Europe the debt crisis has been the result of a truly exogenous shock. In Ireland the crisis was
created by the (foolish) decision to nationalise all private debt; in Spain it was the result of the bursting of the
housing bubble following the early financial crisis; in France and Italy, it was the outcome of rising spreads induced
by the ‘domino effect’ of the Greek debt crisis. In Greece, however, the crisis is of a different type and quality. The
problem with Greece is not only one of too aggressive a fiscal consolidation as it is not (only) the austerity measures
that have made the Greek debt unsustainable: the problems were there before, in the years when Greece was
running excessive deficits, both fiscal and in its current account, despite the low interest rates and its exceptional
growth in GDP and productivity. The problem with Greece is not simply one of policy (although it is also that) but
much more one of structure. It has to do with the fact that the country does not produce enough to have something to
export when its prices become “competitive”; that it has a pre-capitalist structure, largely centred around the family,
where profitability fuels consumption rather than accumulation; that its economy and society are organised on the
basis of a toxic combination of consumerism and statism; that it lacks sufficient and sufficiently diversified
agglomerations, that it doesn’t have a developed and sufficiently independent industrial class (and, accordingly, a
proletariat), that it has too much classical and too little vocational education, that entrepreneurship is not combined
with investment, and that social protection is wrongly pursued through the disbursement of privileges and market
distortions. Addressing these things requires much more than throwing-in a few stimulants to growth – no matter
how important they may be: it requires a new development model, a strategy for the radical restructuring of the
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Greek economy and society – a change of structures. And on this, there is very little for Greece not only in the
Hollande agenda, not only in Barroso’s latest growth plan for Greece but, crucially, also in the agenda of the coming
Greek elections.
You can see this in the – rather reluctantly publicised – election manifestos of virtually all parties running in the
Greek elections. Digging deep, one can actually see a range of views for the future model of development for
Greece. From those arguing for a euro-exit and, by implication, a programme of nationalisation and state
management of the economy – with a choice of communist, populist and fascists varieties – to those arguing for a
radical change of structures and behavioural norms within the European and global systems – again, with the menu
of options ranging from the liberal recipe of deregulation, marketisation and commodification to the Green call for
decentralisation, anti-consumerism and sustainable development. But these proposals are not discussed and are
not contested – they are not what the elections are fought over. Instead, the whole election debate is centred around
the infamous Memorandum and parties are positioned along the pro-/anti-austerity camps, with the traditional
“parties of government” fighting over who can deliver the ‘softest’ version of austerity and much of the rest fighting
over who can deliver a more credible cancellation(?) of the debt. In this, the electoral growth agenda, among the
mainstream parties, is essentially reduced to the following: the favourable release of EU/EIB funds, the support of
the SME and agricultural sectors, the encouragement of economic extroversion mainly through the energy and
tourism sectors, and the modernisation of public administration. These are all good – and necessary – measures to
re-stimulate the economy and trigger a return to growth. But they are nowhere near sufficient for the “qualitative
jump”, for taking Greece to a different path of development. The latter is not discussed; and, unfortunately, the new
“growth-talk” may be contributing to this.
In modern Greek, the same word is used for both “growth” and “development”. Linguistically this makes it easy to
confuse one for the other – and this conflation is also present in the contemporary political discourse. And so, as the
election campaigns focus increasingly on the newly-legitimised “growth agenda”, it seems there is very little space
for a real discussion about the country’s development model. With this, there is very little room to realise that
Greece is today in a position similar to that of the East European countries when they entered transition in the early
1990s. Greece doesn’t only need to attract foreign investments and to modernise its administration – although these
would indeed help with re-igniting growth. It needs to develop capitalism, to create markets, to establish a well-
functioning welfare state, to create a democratic civil society, to consolidate the rule of law and the guarantee of
property rights – it needs to do it all. And of course it needs to engage in a deep and honest discussion about the
model of development that it wants: what type of capitalism, what limits to the markets, what role for the welfare
state, what role for society and for social actors and with what values and norms. In all this, the changing mood in
Europe is absolutely welcome. But it is nowhere near enough.
So let’s not put too much hope on Hollande and the changing winds in Europe: the challenges for Greece remain
extremely high and the solutions are nowhere near forthcoming…
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